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 The Great Chinese Bubble: Justifying the high and rapidly rising prices of residential housing values in China 
Are China's housing prices misaligned with the fundamentals of supply and demand? 
 
By Sharon Wang 
Advised by Professor Joseph Gyourko of the Wharton Real Estate Department 
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Purpose and Significance of Paper 
 
The purpose of this paper is to examine whether China’s decade of rapid growth in home 
prices represents a gigantic housing bubble. The United States Housing meltdown in 
2006-07 triggered a financial crisis that progressed into the worst recession since the 
Great Depression. Six years later, the United States is still recovering from the impact, 
and home prices have just begun to reach pre-crisis levels. There are still millions of 
"shadow" inventory- underwater mortgages, modified mortgages, and delinquent 
mortgages- in the markets. As of January 2014, CoreLogic estimates that there are 2.47 
million loans that are 90 days or more past due or already in foreclosure (CoreLogic, 
2014). While this is the lowest level since 2008 and 23% below 2013 levels, it will take 
time for the market to fully absorb this shadow supply (CoreLogic, 2014).   
 
In contrast, China withstood the turmoil with a $586 billion economic stimulus package 
in 2008 invested in housing, infrastructure, transportation, disaster rebuilding, tax cuts, 
and finance. The stimulus package was welcomed by world leaders who believed that by 
boosting the Chinese economy, China would simultaneously help stabilize the world 
economy. Upon announcement of the fiscal stimulus, markets around the world jumped.  
However, more recently there have been concerns that Chinese banks have loosened 
their lending standards as a result of the stimulus, which could lead to excessive lending 
to home purchasers and even more rapidly rising prices. These loosened lending 
standards may lead to an increase in nonperforming loans. If the unjustified high prices 
collapse, would the Chinese government also perform a bailout, similar to the 
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008? Through this act, the United States 
government had authorized the U.S. Treasury to buy risky and nonperforming debt 
from various lending institution and infused $250 billion into the American banking 
system (US Federal Government). Despite concerns of the Chinese facing similar risks 
that pre-recession America faced, the likelihood of this happening is low, mainly due to 
the high equity levels that the Chinese tend to put into their homes relative to the rest of 
the world. There is an equity buffer in the Chinese market to withstand a drop in prices. 
It is unlikely that the Chinese government will allow prices to drop so much that it eats 
into the equity before implementing measures, as seen by the two decades of effective 
housing policy measures.  
 
Perhaps what is much more concerning is the fact that residential investment accounts 
for 1/6th of China’s economic growth (World Bank). China’s GDP growth is already 
slowest in the past two decades. The direct and indirect effects on the economy outside 
of the banking system would be tremendous. While China continues to be the world’s 
largest exporter, China’s government is attempting to move the country away from 
reliance on state-led industry and exports toward larger domestic consumption, 
especially as the rising wages and appreciating Renminbi have been hindering the 
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nation’s export growth (Silk, 2014). With the majority of the Chinese people's money 
invested in real estate, even if there is enough equity in the Chinese mortgage loans, the 
bursting of a housing bubble would significantly impact Chinese people's internal 
consumption power and slow down the economy even further. A significant slowdown 
in China, being the second largest global economy and a prime driver of the world 
economy, could trigger a downward spiral for the rest of the world.  
Percentage GDP Growth of China and other countries
 
Source: World Bank 
Therefore, the crucial issue is whether there are housing bubbles in major cities 
throughout the country that are about to burst. China has experienced extraordinary 
growth in the housing market during the past decade, which has been accompanied by 
substantial increases in residential property prices. As a result, owning a home has 
become increasingly less affordable for most working families, despite government's 
efforts in implementing policies and programs that support homeownership. The 
government has imposed a long string of housing policy measures to slow home price 
increase, aiming to curb property speculation and improve affordability. While these 
policies have been effective to a certain extent, prices only seem to be temporarily 
suppressed. Furthermore, another thing of concern would be the rent levels in these 
cities. Rents can be an indicator of a bubble, and rents in China have not grown nearly 
as quickly as sales have. In fact, in Beijing and Shanghai, rent levels are well below 2008 
levels (Fung, 2014). 
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Major Housing Reforms  
Setting the Private Residential Real Estate Sector in Motion 
From founding of People’s Republic of China to 1978, all land was publicly owned. There 
was a welfare system in place, in which government provided low-cost but also low-
quality accommodations. In 1988, the Chinese Constitution was amended to allow land 
transactions. In March 1998, the Communist party announced new system to encourage 
people to purchase their homes, using one-time subsidies and mortgage incentives. In 
1994, the government implemented a rent reform, allowed the sales of public housing, 
introducing concepts of “economically affordable houses” and “commodity houses”. In 
August 1999, it was declared that any residential unit built after January 1, 1999 was to 
be bought, not allocated by the government. After the housing reform, the land market 
was better regulated and property rights better protected. (McKinsey Global Institute, 
2009) 
Land market Better Regulated 
China took major steps to improve regulation of its land market through the 1) abolition 
of private transfer of land titles after August 2004 and 2) requirements that all sites sold 
by local governments must through a public listing process with transaction prices 
disclosed. The introduction of the new rule provided better transparency. (Li, 2013) 
Property Rights Better protected 
To protect the legal rights of owners, the National People’s Congress voted in August 
1007 to add a new clause to the General Principles of the Law on Management of Urban 
Real Estate. The clause aims to protect the legal rights of owners and to guarantee the 
residence conditions of private owners after resettlement. The clause allows residential 
land use right scan to be automatically renewed upon expiration. (Li, 2013) 
Current Status of Chinese Property Market 
Residential Property Market Segmentation 
These are the main types of residential properties in China. Developers mainly focus on 
the upper segments of the market.  
1) Commodity Houses/ Private Housing 
Commodity houses are purchased and rented at market prices. In 2010, 
municipal governments limited purchase of homes by non-residents to curtail 
speculation. There are concerns that this may lead to distortion of prices. This is 
the main focus for property developers. Property titles are transferable. Private 
housing segment has been gaining market share, accounting for 35% of total 
supply in 2012 (Li, 2013).  
2) Economic Housing 
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Economically affordable houses are set by the government to be at no more than 
3 - 5% above total construction costs (China Index Institute, 2012). To qualify, 
households must have “hukou” and other requirements. Once purchased, cannot 
be sold for another 5 years. The market share of economically affordable houses 
has been declining sharply (See graph below). Priced at 50-70% discount below 
private housing prices, these used to be built by state-owned real estate 
enterprises, targeted at Middle-income families with residency (Li, 2013). These 
properties are re-saleable after 5 years.  
3) Low-rent Housing 
Initially built by the government, these are meant for low-income families that 
cannot afford a house. Units are allotted to families and are non-tradable.  
4) Public Rental Housing 
Newly introduced in 2007-08, public rental housing units is targeted at the 
population working in the major cities but do not have residency (hukou). These 
are also meant for families with income constraints but not eligible to apply for 
economic and low-rent housing.  
5) Shanty-town Resettlement 
Started in 2007 for the resettlement needs of shanty-town occupants. These are 
not re-saleable.  
 
Source: China National Bureau of Statistics 
Policy Intervention 
Policy intervention by the Chinese government dates as far back as 2003. The industry was 
highly under-regulated prior to these policies. Demand side tightening measures are more 
common adopted, because the Central government has limited control over housing supply due 
to the highly fragmented nature of industry. After the 2008 financial crisis, the government 
implemented monetary easing such as mortgage rate cuts, and incentives were provided by local 
governments for home purchases, such as with ranting of residency status in cities.  
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Supply-side restrictive measures 
• Breaking down large sites into smaller sites during land sale to increase asset turnover 
and completion 
• Idle Land Policy (confiscating land set idle for over two years) 
• Land Appreciation Tax  
• Development of affordable homes 
• Increasing supply of small units 
Demand-side restrictive measures 
• Increasing deed tax on luxury properties 
• Forbidding resale of units before completion 
• Capital Gain Tax on resale of units within two – five years of purchase 
• Price caps on primary construction launches 
• Real Estate Tax in Shanghai and Chongqing 
• House Purchase Restrictions 
Credit measures targeting at real estate 
• Project LTV limited at 65% 
• LTV limit of residential mortgages across first, second, and third –time home buyers 
 
Rising Income Level and High Savings Rate 
 
Two main factors make the Chinese consumer market stand out: 1) a rapidly rising per 
capita income level and 2) a high savings rate. According to Boston Consulting Group, 
China continues to have the highest percentage increase in assets under management, at 
36.8%, boosted by strong economic growth and appreciation of Renminbi. Per-capita 
disposable income and population of middle class expected to continue to increase, 
though at a slower pace. (Milkin Institute) Chinese households own about $3.2 trillion 
in financial wealth, which is approximately 44% of the wealth of Asia-Pacific excluding 
Japan. Additionally, 64% of the assets are cash holdings. (Xu L. J., 2012) 
 
National savings rate are important for the long-run health of economies. China has a 
National Savings Rate savings rate of 49.5% of GDP, which is ranked top 5 in the world 
and first amongst commodity-importing countries. This high savings rate can help the 
nation withstand a deterioration in global financing conditions. (Bank of America 
Private Wealth Management, 2012) 
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National savers: The Top 10 Highest Savings Rates Countries in 2012 
 
Source: International Monetary Fund as of April 2013 
High Homeownership Rate  
As a result, homeownership rate is very high in China. Homeownership was at 90% in 
2012, which is 6th highest in the world. This can be compared to the United States 
homeownership rate, which has been fluctuating around 65%. It is believed that the 
high homeownership rate of the Chinese is due to a mix of cultural influences and 
limited investing opportunities for the Chinese. The Chinese government limits the 
amount of Chinese money invested abroad, and the Chinese stock markets are high in 
volatility. As the Chinese citizens' net wealth grew exponentially in the past decade, 
many Chinese view investing in real estate as the single most safe and feasible way to 
invest their money.  
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Source: Barclay's Research, Xinhua English News 
Leverage in the System 
 
In terms of financing of homes, Chinese homeowners take on very low leverage. Even 
without taking into consideration housing price growth, the Loan-to-Value (LTV) ratio 
is extremely low when compared to other nations. The average LTV ratio is around 21 - 
30%. It is believed that the low leverage levels is due to the high savings rate of the 
nation (49.5% of GDP) and ceilings put on LTVs by  the Housing Provident Fund. 
Additionally, most home loans in China are variable-rate mortgages, which can be 
concerning especially with the mortgage rates on the rise. The Chinese housing finance 
system is mainly comprised of 1) the Housing Provident Fund lending, and 2) 
private sector mortgage lending.  
 
Average Interest Rates on Home Mortgages 
 
Source: Standard Chartered bank (2013) 
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1) Housing Provident Fund (住房工資金) 
The Chinese has a system called the Housing Provident Fund (HPF) in place to curfew 
the amount of debt one can take on. The HPF is a defined contribution pension, of 
which contribution come from both employers and employees. Monthly contribution 
from both sides should be at least 5% of the employees' monthly salary, and capped at 
20%. Each city has its own HPF Management center. Additionally, the max loan amount 
is Rmb 0.4 mn for individual and Rmb 0.8 mn for a household. The allowable loan 
amount is set at 15 – 25x HPF account amount. The max LTV for small unit (<90 square 
meters) is 80%, and the max LTV for a larger unit larger unit (>90 square meters) is 
70%. (Housing Finance Network, 2013) 
 
2) Private Sector Mortgage 
Private sector is the main source of home finance, accounting for 82% of total home 
mortgages last year (Li, 2013). China’s private sector mortgage grew 173 times since 
1998, now the second largest Asia-Pacific market (US $1.16 trillion) after Japan (US 
$1.29 trillion) (Housing Finance Network, 2013).   
 
  China Mortgage Loan LTV Limits       China Mortgage Loan Rates 
 
Source: PBoC, J.P. Morgan Equity Research 
Just what is a Bubble? 
Asset bubbles have been the cause of many economic recessions, but is there a way to 
empirically spot the bubble before it bursts? In New York Times, Yale economist Robert 
Shiller listed factors giving rise to a bubble. He argued that a bubble is a form of 
"psychological malfunction", and below is a checklist to determine if there is an asset 
bubble. (Shiller, 2010)  
1) Sharp increases in the price of an asset 
2) Great public excitement about said increases 
3) An accompanying media frenzy 
4) Stories of people earning a lot of money, causing envy among people who aren’t 
5) Growing interest in the asset class among the general public 
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6) “New era” theories justify unprecedented price increases 
7) A decline in lending standards 
 
All of the above have been seen in China's major cities. Determinants of Home prices 
include fundamentals of housing supply and demand (Glindro et al., 2005). Another 
factor (which arguably can be categorized as a fundamental) is government support and 
policies (Huang, 2004). As seen from the graph below from JP Morgan Asia Research, 
China's property market represents a highly regulated industry, and the government has 
significant impact on the property index. Similarly, Xu and Chen found in a paper 
published in 2010 that monetary policy clearly accelerated home price growth, while 
speculative investment inflow did not have a significant impact on home price growth 
after controlling for money supply growth (Xu and Chen, 2010).  
 
 
JP Morgan China Property index 
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So, Is There a Bubble?  
 
The possibility of a real estate bubble in China is hardly a trivial matter, and much 
research have already been done. There are mixed results from papers written so far on 
this issue. Most agree that there is a higher chance of a bubble existing in mega- 
metropolitan cities such as Beijing and Shanghai. Ahuja and colleagues in 2010 found 
that there is lack of evidence of a nationwide housing bubble, but some studies find 
overpricing may exist in mega-metropolitan areas such as Beijing, Shanghai, and 
Chongqing (Ahuja et al, 2010). In a paper by Wu, Gyourko, and Deng in 2010, it was 
stated that “although we could not provide a definitive test with our limited 
data…multiple parts of evidence…suggest the potential for substantial mispricing in 
Beijing and other Chinese housing markets…The magnitude of the increase in land 
values over the past 2 – 3 years in particular in Beijing is unprecedented to our 
knowledge” (Wu, Gyourko, & Deng, 2010). In 2011, Wall Street Journal published an 
article titled “The Great Property Bubble of China May Be Popping”, suggesting that 
after years of housing prices gone wild, prices are finally heading downwards (Davis, 
2011). World Bank economists warned in press conferences that a downturn in property 
prices was among the biggest economic risks that China faces. While there was a 
slowdown in the property markets in 2010-2011, especially due to government’s efforts 
to rein in rising residential property prices and create a soft landing, such was with 
abovementioned demand and supply restraints. However, prices have only continued 
escalating upwards since 2011.  
Escalating Land Prices 
China’s official data from the National Bureau of Statistics website is haunted by 
controversy, with widespread doubts about its accuracy. For example, independent 
estimates of China’s GDP growth suggest that the official data might be exaggerated. But 
the one thing we can be certain of are the escalating land prices in China (Orlik, 2011). 
The government introduced in 2004 that all sites sold by local governments must go 
through a public listing process, enabling researchers to obtain public data on land 
prices. The Chinese National hedonic Land Price Index (CRLPI), an index developed by 
Joseph Gyourko, Jing Wu, and Yongheng Deng in 2012, tracks the real land prices of 35 
city markets in China.  Since the first quarter of 2004, real land prices have increased by 
approximately 200%. There was prices surge just before the recession and dropped 
during the global financial crisis. Prices quickly picked up after the 2008 stimulus was 
implemented. This price escalation continued until 2011 when the stimulus came off as 
the government once again worry about the overpriced property values and affordability 
of homes. Similarly for city-wide data, we see the common trend of rapidly rising land 
prices in each city.  
13 
 
 
 
Source: Wharton/NUS/Tsinghua Chinese Residential Land Price Indexes (CRLPI) 
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Urbanization remains a key driver of demand 
What is the cause of the escalating prices? The abovementioned high homeownership 
rate, high savings rate, and high income growth are all factors. Arguably the most 
important factor in the rapidly rising prices of homes is urbanization, which is the main 
demand driver for residential houses. Demand curve is very clearly shifting outwards 
due to urbanization and strong economic fundamentals. In fact, urban population of 
China is expected to increase by 26% over the next decade (Economic Intelligence Unit). 
This is caused by burgeoning economic success and rapidly rising standard of living. In 
2011, China's urban population has already exceeded 50 % of its total population for the 
first time, meaning that over half of China now lives in major cities. In fact, McKinsey 
Global Institute found that if current trend holds, nearly 1 billion people will live in 
urban centers by 2025. As seen in the graph below by the Reserve Bank of Australia, 
urbanization rate is predicted to reach 75% of total Chinese population by 2040.  
 
 
Urbanization Rate, projected by Reserve Bank of Australia 
 
Source: United Nations, Reserve Bank of Australia 
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China Map: Population Size and Urbanization Rate by Provinces and Municipalities 
 
Source: JP Morgan Asia Pacific Research 
Determining the supply curve: Flat or Steep? 
 
Now that we've established with evidence the escalating prices and high demand of the 
Chinese property market, the shape of the supply curve in China can help determine 
whether there is a housing bubble in China's major cities. To justify the prices, we would 
hope that the supply curve slopes upwards instead of laying flat. There was a total of 3.4 
billion square meter of floor space built in China in 2012 (CEIC). Arguably, the scale of 
construction was necessary to house 20 million annual increase in urban population. 
The question is not that whether prices should increase, but by how much is reasonable? 
It is impossible to perform a detailed econometrics study due to limited readily available 
data on the market cycles in China for analysis. Due to the limitations, this study 
performs a "back-of-the-envelope" analysis to determine whether supply might be 
outstripping demand.   
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Methodology 
To arrive at a reliable framework to model supply and demand, we used official data 
from the Chinese National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) and formulated the following 
assumptions. We have come up with a framework to calculate supply and demand in 
terms of number of units. We collected both national and city data.  
 
 
CALCULATION OF DEMAND (IN UNITS) 
 
• Average Number of Households 
The average number of households represents an estimate of housing demand, 
because household formation represents home buyers. The high homeownership 
rate in China suggests that most of the household formation translates to owners 
rather than renters. This data can be found readily available from NBS or from 
dividing total population with the average persons per household.  
 
Associate Professor of Community and Regional Planning at Iowa State 
University suggests adding a vacancy rate percentage to the demand estimate. 
The idea is that an efficient housing market should offer prospective buyers a 
variety of choices of units so they might choose which one, if any, best suits their 
needs. (Woods & Barta, 2000) 
 
CALCULATION OF SUPPLY (IN UNITS) 
 
• Total Floor Space  
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐹 𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑆𝑆 = 𝑃𝑇𝑆𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑇𝑃 × 𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐹 𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑆𝑆 𝑆𝑆𝐹 𝐶𝑇𝑆𝑃𝑇𝑇 − 𝐷𝑆𝐷𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑇𝑃𝑇𝑃𝐷 
𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑇𝐹𝑆 𝑀𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐹 = 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑇𝐹𝑆 𝑀𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐹
𝑃𝑆𝐹𝐷𝑇𝑃
× 𝑃𝑆𝐹𝐷𝑇𝑃𝐷 
• Average Flat Size 
𝐴𝑣𝑆𝐹𝑇𝑣𝑆 𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑆𝑃𝑆𝑆 = 𝐴𝑣𝑆𝐹𝑇𝑣𝑆 𝑁𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑇𝑃𝑇𝑇 𝐻𝑇𝑃𝐷𝑆ℎ𝑇𝑇𝑜 𝑆𝑃𝑆𝑆 × 𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐹 𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑆𝑆 𝑆𝑆𝐹 𝐶𝑇𝑆𝑃𝑇𝑇 
𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑇𝐹𝑆 𝑀𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐹
𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑇
= 𝑃𝑆𝐹𝐷𝑇𝑃𝐷
𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑇
× 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑇𝐹𝑆 𝑀𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐹
𝑃𝑆𝐹𝐷𝑇𝑃
 
• Total Units 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑇𝐷 = 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐹 𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑆𝑆 𝐴𝑣𝑆𝐹𝑇𝑣𝑆 𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑆𝑃𝑆𝑆⁄  
𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑇𝐷 = 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑇𝐹𝑆 𝑀𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐹/ 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑇𝐹𝑆 𝑀𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐹
𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑇
 
  
17 
 
Nation-Wide Data 
 
We multiplied China’s Urban Population with Floor Space per Capita in Urban China. 
Total Floor Space is obtained by subtracting estimated demolitions from the resulting 
numbers. Average Flat Size was obtained by multiplying Average National Household 
Size with Floor Space per Capita. Total units was obtained by dividing Total Floor Space 
with the Average Flat Size. This is our measure of housing supply. Housing demand is 
measured by average number of households.  
 
DEMOLITIONS 
To estimate demolitions, we gathered data from State-Owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission of the State Council. According to the commission, there 
was a total of 1.8 billion square meters of floor space demolished between 2008 and 
2010. This implies an annual demolition rate of at least 4.5%. However, stock of 
dilapidated residential buildings should gradually decline as buildings are replaced with 
higher-quality construction. Furthermore, expropriation process is beginning to cost 
more due to enforcement of property rights (Henderson, 2009), which also slows down 
demolition rate. These numbers are in line with the depreciation rate from Chinese 
national accounts with average building life span of 50 years. Hence, we produced the 
following demolition rate chart, which will be subtracted from total floor space. 
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 URBAN CHINA DATA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: National Bureau of Statistics, Australia Reserve Bank, and “Sustaining China’s 
Economic Growth after the Global Financial Crisis” (Lardy)  
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Supply vs. Demand in Urban China (1996 – 2012) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SUPPLY 
DEMAND 
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Change in Supply and Demand (1996 – 2012) 
 
 
 
We see that the average annual increase is 5.48% for supply but only 3.62% for demand. 
It may be possible that the nation started out with an incredible amount of supply 
shortage, but the data suggests that supply seems to be outstripping demand at the 
national level currently. Furthermore, Total Residential Floor Space (8.28%) is growing 
at a much faster pace than Total Units (5.48%). This is because while average household 
size has shrunk from 3.7 persons per household in 1996 to 3.02 persons per household 
in 2012, the average size of a residential flat in urban China has increased from 63 
square meters in 1996 to 99 square meters in 2012. This led to a 193% increase in floor 
area per capita since 1996.  
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City-level Data 
Understanding that real estate markets are local, looking only at national data would be 
insufficient in trying to answer the question of whether there are housing bubbles in 
China’s cities. We analyzed data from 10 major cities in China: Beijing, Shanghai, 
Chongqing, Tianjin, Guangzhou, Nanjing, Wuhan, Dalian, Chengdu, and Hangzhou. We 
calculated total residential floor space for each city for a measure of housing supply.  
 
However, we had some doubts regarding the accuracy of the data for Number of 
Households at the city-level from National Bureau of Statistics. Official numbers reveal 
that number of households in many of the 10 cities did not increase much or at all. For 
example, number of households in Guangzhou, Dalian, Wuhan, and Chengdu remained 
constant since 1995 according to official numbers. Due to the high urbanization trends 
over the past two decades, we know that this simply cannot be true. This 
misrepresentation might be a result of statistics only the Huji (戶籍) system.  The 
Chinese relies on hukous (戶口), or residential permits, to record the number of 
households in a city; however, there are many city residents holding illegal hukous, and 
these people are not reflected in the statistics. Due to limitations of the data from 
National Bureau of Statistics, we were unable to perform the precise demand vs. supply 
analysis in terms of number of flats at the city level. Nevertheless, we use Beijing as an 
example for city-level data, because the official numbers reflect a slightly more accurate 
picture of how much number of households have risen over the years, increasing 460% 
since 1995.  
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BEIJING DATA 
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Supply vs. Demand in Beijing (2005 - 2012) 
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Data from NBS does not reach as far back for city-level data. We were able to calculate 
data for supply from 2005 – 2009. Although the data for number of households is 
staggered, the line regression provides an estimate for household demand from 1995 – 
2012. Beijing has an average annual increase of 6.6% in supply, which is higher than the 
estimate for Urban China. On the demand side, we see an incredible average annual 
increase of 14.5% in number of households. This suggests that demand is exceeding 
supply at the Beijing city-level. Similar to national data, Total Residential Floor Space 
(19.7%) is growing at a much faster pace than Total Units (6.6%). This is because while 
average household size has shrunk from 3.1 persons per household in 1996 to 2.5 
persons per household in 2012, the average size of a residential flat in urban China has 
been increasing at approximately 6 square meters per year. Hence, floor space per 
capita has been increasing at around 14% per year. However, the above information 
should to be taken with a grain of salt, as we only have 5 years of data for supply. 
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DATA FOR OTHER CITIES 
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Conclusions 
The landscape of China's property markets have changed drastically since the successful 
privatization of the housing sector in the 1990s. However, the years of extraordinary 
pricing growth give rise to concerns that pricing bubbles have formed in some cities. The 
collapse of these bubbles would lead to slowdown of the nation and potentially the 
global economy as well.  
 
To combat large bubbles in cities, Chinese policy makers have implemented a series of 
corrective measures after 2008 to ensure a “soft landing”. Required reserve ratios for 
banks have increased 12 times in 2010-11, and interest rates at People’s Bank of China 
have been increased to curtail housing mortgages. Facing a tightening credit market, 
real estate developers have begun to produce fewer units. Yet, prices continue to escalate. 
To better combat housing bubbles, the Milkin Institute suggests that property taxes 
should be better implemented in addition to the monetary policy instruments. Crowe et 
al. (2011) states that “higher rates of property taxation can help limit housing booms as 
well as short-run volatility around an upward trend in prices.” However, China’s 
property tax reform faces enormous challenges including resistance from influential 
interest groups. Successful establishment of a property tax as a major revenue source 
requires not only strong assessment techniques and tax design but also political 
determination and administrative reform.  
 
In aggregate at the nation-level, supply seems to be exceeding demand with a higher 
amount of supply built each year than demanded from urbanization. Assuming data 
from National Bureau of Statistics is accurate, the high and escalating prices in China 
seem to be unjustified. Even if the cities had started with a large shortage of supply, we 
should have expected some slowdown in prices according to these trends. Prices do not 
necessarily have to fall, but an increase of 6-15% a year suggests a much stronger 
demand than supply, which is not the case at the national level.  
 
However, at the city-level, Beijing seems to be experiencing the opposite. With an a 
average annual increase of 6.6% in total residential units and an average annual increase 
of 14.5% in number of households, data suggest that demand is exceeding supply in 
Beijing. However, city-level data analysis is limited by lack of supply data pre 2005 and 
post 2012. With only 5 years of data for supply, we should take the results with a grain of 
salt. Due to inaccurate data for number of households, we could not perform a detailed 
supply versus demand analysis on the city-level data for the 9 other cities. However, we 
were able to calculate Total Residential Floor Space for the cities. It is evident through 
the graphs that the supply has been steadily increasing in each of the 10 major cities 
analyzed.  
 
 
27 
 
 
It seems that we are not the only ones realizing that the rising prices of residential prices 
in China's cities might be reaching a plateau. Big real estate players in China have begun 
to realize that the Chinese property market appears to be softening along with the rest of 
the country's economy. According to Cushman & Wakefield Research, the average yields 
for property transactions in Beijing has declined from 12.5% in 2004 to 6% in 2013. 
Similarly, property prices in Shanghai used to see average yields of 9% in 2004, which 
has decreased to 6% in 2013. Those who think that values have peaked have cut back on 
Chinese investing and are looking abroad to invest in foreign estates (Fung, 2014). 
However, not all developers think this way. For every transaction, there is both a buyer 
and a seller. Where smaller cities in China are facing swelling inventories and falling 
prices, Beijing is still seeing major constructions where investors believe the market is 
healthy and prices justified by fundamentals.   
 
Despite the findings of this study, our view on the Chinese housing market is still 
cautiously positive. China has several factors in place that the US did not have during 
the housing meltdown in 2008. The Chinese government requires high down payments 
and limits the LTV on property purchases. Most of the homeowners have enough equity 
in their properties to withstand a price drop. Essentially, China has accumulated a large 
enough cushion against the possibility of a crash in their housing markets. Furthermore, 
the Chinese government's debt level is low at approximately 40% of GDP, compared to 
92% in the United States (Li, 2013). China could also call in the $3 trillion in foreign 
exchange reserves and $700 billion in required reserves in People's Bank of China when 
they do need it. Consequently, China is arguably less vulnerable to a liquidity crunch 
than most other nations.   
 
Therefore, while our study suggests that supply might be exceeding demand at the 
national level, a financial crisis the magnitude of the US Housing Crisis of 2006-2008 is 
unlikely to occur. However, the Chinese will face direct effects of the reduced residential 
investments as developers go bankrupt and mortgages default. The phenomenon of 
ghost cities will be more prevalent. The reduced property investments will have spillover 
effects in industries such as rugs, lamps, and lightning fixtures. We can also expect new 
construction to drop to very low levels. While China is more protected than U.S. was 
from the bursting of property bubbles, we do not need a financial crisis to happen for 
this to be important to China and the rest of the world.  
 
Lastly, it is essential for China to compile consistent home price indices at both the local 
and national level. Regulators of China should improve the data collection practices to 
better access the effectiveness of current housing policies and to spot the early signs of a 
housing bubble.  
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